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A bstract. The Java dialect Java Card for programming smartcards 
contains some features which do not exist in Java. Java Card distin­
guishes persistent and transient data (data stored in EEPROM and 
RAM, respectively). Because power to a smartcard can suddenly be in­
terrupted by a so-called card tear, by someone removing the smartcard 
from the reader, Java Card provides a notion of transaction to ensure 
that updates of multiple fields in persistent memory can be performed 
atomically. This paper describes a way to reason about these Java Card 
specific language features.
1 Introdu ction
The Java Card language for programming smartcards has attracted a lot of a t­
tention in the formal methods community, especially people working on formal 
methods for Java. In many respects, it provides an ideal target for formal m eth­
ods: the language and its API are simple, programs are very small, and their 
correctness is critical.
However, although the Java Card programming language for smartcards is 
usually presented as a subset of Java, Java Card has several features in addition 
to  standard Java, which are specific to  smartcards. F irst, Java Card distinguishes 
the two kinds of memory th a t are available on smartcards, persistent (EEPROM) 
and transient (RAM). Second, because a sm artcard can be subject to  a sudden 
loss of power due to  a so-called card tear -namely when the card is removed from 
the reader- Java Card offers a transaction mechanism  similar to  th a t found in 
databases; this enables a programmer to  ensure th a t several updates to  memory 
are performed atomically, i.e. either all the updates are performed or none is. 
There are more Java Card specific features, but we do not take them  into account 
in this paper.
To accurately reason about the behavior of Java Card programs -and  to  do 
program verification- these additional features should be taken into account. 
Most work on the verification of Java Card programs, with the exception of [1], 
ignores these special features. Given the complexities of program verification, 
this can certainly be justified for pragmatic reasons: before we try  to  verify tha t 
a program is correct in the presence of potential card tears, it makes sense to
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2first verify its correctness under the simplifying assumption th a t no card tears 
occur and no transactions are ever aborted. However, ultimately we would like 
to  be able to  reason about such Java Card features, and this is what we set out 
to  do in this paper.
The context of this work is the verification of Java programs th a t have been 
specified with JML [2], using the LOOP tool in combination with the theorem 
prover PVS. The verification of programs with the LOOP tool ultimately relies 
on a denotational semantics of Java and JML, for which a Hoare logic and 
weakest precondition calculus have been developed. In short, the LOOP tool 
compiles JML annotated Java source code into PVS theories. Proving these 
theories in PVS implies th a t it is formally verified th a t the Java program behaves 
the way it is specified in JML. For a more detailed overview of this LOOP project, 
see [3]. One of the achievements of this work has been th a t a commercial Java 
Card application has been completely verified, showing th a t such verifications of 
real Java Card programs are feasible. Still, our verifications ignore the possibility 
of card tears, so our next challenge is to  take this into account.
To reason about card tears and transactions we need a formal semantics of 
these features (or a programming logic which takes them  into account). Rather 
than defining a semantics of Java Card including these features from scratch, 
we will try  to  desugar Java Card programs with their special features into con­
ventional Java programs, effectively modeling card tears and transactions inside 
Java. The central trick we use here is th a t we model card tears as special ex­
ceptions, a trick also used in [4,5]. Such a modular approach has several benefits 
(provided it is successful of course...): it is less work, it is easier to  understand, 
and because it is independent of a particular semantics or programming logic 
for Java, it will be applicable in many other settings, not just the particular 
semantics and programming logic of Java th a t is used in the LOOP project. 
Modularity is not just a desirable quality for programs, but also for theories 
about programming languages!
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows: Sect. 2 explains the 
peculiarities of Java Card th a t we want to  reason about. Sect. 3, 4 and 5 describe 
our approach in detail. Sect. 6 says something about the implementation of our 
idea.
2 Card tears and tran sactions in Java Card
In this section we briefly explain the peculiarities of Java Card as opposed to  Java 
when it comes to  card tears and transactions. For a more complete explanation, 
see [6] or the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) specification [7].
P e rs is te n t  vs. T ra n s ie n t M em o ry  Java Card distinguishes two kinds of 
memory th a t are available on smartcards, persistent (EEPROM) and transient
3(RAM).1 The main difference is tha t persistent memory will keep its value when 
power is switched off. Java Card objects and their fields are allocated in EEP- 
ROM, so the fields of objects will keep their value during a power loss. However, 
the Java Card API offers methods to  allocate arrays in RAM, so-called transient 
arrays. If a field is a transient array, then the contents of this array are lost as 
soon as power is lost, but the field itself, which is a reference to  the piece of RAM 
allocated for the array, keeps its value as this is stored in EEPROM. Reasons 
for using RAM rather than EEPROM for (array) field are efficiency -reading 
and writing RAM is quicker than EEPROM -, the limited lifetime of EEPROM 
-EEPRO M  can only support a limited number of writes before the chips stops 
functioning-, and security -d a ta  kept in RAM is harder to  spy out and more­
over it is lost as soon as power is lost.2 The stack is also stored in RAM, so the 
parameters and result of method calls and local variables are all lost as soon as 
power is lost.
C a rd  te a r s  In many card readers it is possible to  tear the sm artcard out of the 
reader while it is in operation. Such a so-called card tear results in a sudden loss 
of power. All data stored in RAM is lost when such a card tear occurs. The Java 
Card platform incorporates a special clean-up when power supply is restored, 
before any normal action applet operation takes place.
T ra n sac tio n s  To cope with card tears, the Java Card API offers a so-called 
transaction mechanism. This can be used to  ensure th a t several updates to 
persistent memory are executed as a single atomic operation, i.e. either all 
updates are performed or none at all. The Java Card API offers three m eth­
ods for this: b eg in T ran sac tio n , com m itTransaction and ab o rtT ran sac tio n . 
After a b eg in T ran sac tio n  all changes to  persistent data are executed con­
ditionally. Note th a t changes to  transient data, including local variables, are 
executed unconditionally. The transaction is ended by com m itT ransaction or 
ab o rtT ran sac tio n ; in the former case the updates are committed, in the latter 
case the updates are discarded. If a card tear occurs during a transaction, any 
updates to  persistent data done during th a t transaction are discarded. This in 
fact happens the next time the sm artcard powers up during the special clean-up 
mentioned before.
Example 1 (Java Card sample). Fig. 1 illustrates the use of the transaction 
mechanism, the use of the API method for allocating a transient array, and 
the use of JML to specify invariants and postconditions.
Every object of class A has a persistent field p and a field t  th a t is a transient 
array of length 1. This means th a t whenever the sm artcard loses power, the
1 Smartcards will also have ROM, which is used for pre-installed program code, but 
this is of no concern to the Java Card programmer.
2 Indeed, for security reasons, the contents of transient arrays can also be cleared 
automatically at certain events other than card tears, e.g. the de-selection of an 
applet.
4class A {
/ /  persistent field p, allocated in EEPROM 
byte p;
//@ invariant p % 2 == 0 && 0<= p && p < 10;
/ /  transient array t , so t [0] is allocated in RAM 
byte[] t = makeTransientByteArray(1,CLEAR_ON_RESET); 
//@ invariant t != null && t.length == 1;
//@ invariant t[0] % 2 == 0;
//@ ensures p == \old(p) + 2 && t[0] == \old(t[0])+2; 
void m() {
beginTransaction();
p++; t[0]+—+; pH—+;
if (p < 10) commitTransaction();
else abortTransaction(); 
t[0]++;
}
}
F ig . 1. Example program using transactions and transient data, with JML spec­
ification
contents of t [0 ]  is lost, but p and t  itself-i.e . the pointer to  the position in the 
RAM memory where t [0 ]  is stored- keep their value.
There are four JML annotations in the example, written as comments starting 
with //@. This includes three invariants stating th a t p is even, th a t t  is not 
null and has always length 1 and th a t t [ 0 ]  is also even. This also includes 
one postcondition (ensures clause) for method m, stating th a t the method will 
increase the values of p and t [ 0 ]  by 2. The use of the transaction guarantees 
tha t the invariant for p will not be broken if the method m is interrupted by a 
card tear. The treatm ent of transient memory makes sure th a t the invariants 
for t  are not broken by a card tear. Note th a t the postcondition only relates 
to  normal term ination of the method, and does not say anything about what 
happens if the method ‘aborts’ because of a card tear.
Incorrect use of this mechanism can result in a T ran sac tio n E x cep tio n  being 
thrown:
— The transactions cannot be nested. So if a new b eg in T ran sac tio n  is called 
within another transaction a T ran sac tio n E x cep tio n  is thrown. Likewise 
such an exception is thrown if a com m itT ransaction or a b o rtT ran sac tio n
is called while there is no transaction in progress.
Reasoning about this requires no special machinery, as specifications for 
enforcing the correct use of the methods for beginning or ending transactions 
can easily be expressed in JML.
— A T ran sac tio n E x cep tio n  is also thrown if certain hardware limitations are 
exceeded. Only a finite amount of storage, called the com m it buffer, is avail­
able to  keep track of the conditional updates done during a transaction. The 
size of this commit buffer depends on the specific sm artcard hardware. If 
there are too many updates inside a transaction, and the available space in 
the commit buffer is exhausted, again a T ran sac tio n E x cep tio n  is thrown.
5We will ignore the possibility of exhausting the commit buffer, and the result­
ing T ransactionE xcep tion . Proving th a t this never happens is best done in 
an ad-hoc manner, i.e. by counting the maximum number of bytes needed in 
the commit buffer for every transaction in a program and checking tha t this 
does not exceed the space of the commit buffer. Including this in a general 
program logic would be overly complicated. Also, how much space needed in 
the commit buffer for the bookkeeping associated with an individual update 
will be specific to  the particular implementation of the platform and/or the 
underlying hardware.
Some (native) classes in the Java Card API provide persistent data which 
is not subjected to  card tears: the counter associated with a PIN object, which 
keeps track of how many incorrect PINs have been entered, is not restored in 
the event of a card tear. Otherwise the transaction mechanism might allow an 
unlimited number of guesses for the PIN code.
2.1 W h a t can  go w rong , a n d  how  to  avo id  it.
Before we consider ways of describing the semantics of card tears and transac­
tions, and how this might be used as a basis for reasoning about these language 
features, we first approach the issue from a different angle, by investigating what 
can go wrong if code is subjected to  card tears or if it contains transactions, and 
what could we do to  avoid these problems. Or, in other words, what are the prop­
erties tha t we fail to  establish in our current verifications of Java Card code, but 
which we would like to  be able to  prove.
In v a ria n ts  Invariants usually play a crucial role in ensuring th a t a piece of code 
behaves correctly. When a card tear occurs, invariants may be left broken as 
a result. After all, invariants may temporarily be broken during the execution 
of a method.
Typically, the transaction mechanism is used to  prevent card tears from 
disturbing invariants th a t involve persistent data, as in Fig. 1. 
P o s tc o n d itio n s  Just ensuring th a t invariants are not left broken as a result 
of a card tear may not be enough to  ensure th a t a method is correct. We 
may want to  establish additional properties. For example, in our example in 
Fig. 1, we might want to  ensure th a t if method m is interrupted by a card 
tear, it will either leave p unchanged of increase p by 2, and not say reset p 
to  0, which is allowed by the invariant; in this case we would like to  establish 
p == \o ld (p )  | |  p == \o ld (p )+ 2  as postcondition of m in the event of a 
card tear.
There are two mechanisms th a t we can use to  ensure th a t an invariant is not 
left broken (c.q. an additional postcondition is met) after a card tear occurs:
— the transaction mechanism; e.g., in Fig. 1, the transaction mechanism ensures 
th a t the invariant for p is maintained in the event of a card tear.
6— the clearing of transient memory; e.g., in Fig. 1, the clearing of transient 
memory ensures th a t the invariant for t [ 0 ]  is maintained (or, rather, re­
established) in the event of a card tear.
The former mechanism is only relevant if an invariant (postcondition) involves 
transient data, the second mechanism is only relevant if it involves persistent 
data.
Given the nature of transient data, and the fact th a t transient data typically 
serves as scratch-pad memory, it is unlikely th a t we will be interested in any 
invariants or postconditions involving transient data. (Indeed, the whole idea of 
an invariant seems at odds with the notion of transient memory.) So, for many 
Java Card applications, it will not be necessary to  take the clearing of transient 
memory into account to  establish their correctness.
Invariants which only depend on persistent memory can be dealt without 
trying to  formalize the transaction mechanism, in two ways:
— Ensure that an invariant is never broken.
It may seem an overly simplistic approach, but in practice, many invari­
ants are never broken. For example, in Fig. 1, the invariant t  != nu ll && 
t . l e n g t h  == 1 will never be broken. This is the approach taken in [1]. 
Still, one has to  be careful about the notion level of atomicity here. E.g., 
an invariant a == b will be temporarily broken during the execution of the 
statem ent in t  x = (a++) + (b++), even though the invariant will hold be­
fore and after execution of the statem ent if there are no card tears. When 
reasoning at the level of source code our notion of atomicity will be coarser 
than  what it really is.
— Ensure that the invariant is never broken outside a transaction.
Some invariants will have to  be temporarily broken. (E.g. if we are updating 
two fields and there is an invariant expressing a relationship between these 
fields, the invariant will typically be broken after updating the first of these 
fields.) If these invariant involves persistent data, then this should be done 
inside a transaction.
3 M odeling  card tears
To model card tears inside Java we use the same trick used in [4,5], i.e. card 
tears are modeled as a special kind of exception, which can arise at any moment 
during execution. Like an exception, a card tear is effectively an abrupt change 
of the flow of control. A difference is th a t whereas an exception can be caught, 
a card tear cannot be caught, as there is no VM executing th a t could execute 
an exception handler. However, conceptually we can consider the recovery to  a 
card tear th a t happens the next time the card powers up (i.e. the undoing of 
any unfinished transaction and the clearing of all transient data) as the excep­
tion handler for a card tear exception. We introduce a special exception class 
CardTearException for modeling card tears.3
3 Strictly speaking, CardTearException should not be an Exception, but rather an 
Error, because we clearly do not want CardTearExceptions to be caught by any
7There are several ways to  account for the possibility of a C ardTearException 
being thrown at any moment during execution, namely at a syntactical level, at 
a semantic level, or at a logical level:
— One possibility is to  do this purely syntactically, by desugaring any sequence 
of statements, e.g.
S1 ; S2;
to  include calls to  a method possib leC ardT ear before and after each state­
ment, e.g.
possibleCardTear(); S1; possibleCardTear(); S2; possibleCardTear();
where p ossib leC ardT ear is a method which either performs a sk ip , or 
throws a CardTearException. We can even give a possible implementation 
of this method possib leC ardT ear in Java, for instance
possibleCardTear() {
if (cardtear_counter---< 0) throw new CardTearException();
_________________________________________________________
where ca rd te a r_ c o u n te r  is a global (i.e. final static) variable, initialized to 
an unknown value.
Such a syntactic approach has its limitations, namely the level of atomicity 
of statements th a t we can distinguish at the level of source code syntax. This 
notion of atomicity is coarser than  it is in reality. E.g. in the example above 
we trea t the statements S i as atomic, whereas in reality only individual 
byte code operations are atomic. For example, a statem ent such as in t  x = 
(a++) + (b++) would have to  be rewritten into a++; b++; in t  x=a+b; if 
we want to  include possible card tears after incrementing a or b.4
— Instead of modeling the possibility of card tears syntactically, as sketched 
above, an alternative would be to  redefine our semantics of Java to  include 
card tears. For instance, in the LOOP project we use a denotational seman­
tics, and we could redefine the semantics of composition ; and increment 
operation ++ to  include the possibility of an exception being thrown. Effec­
tively, this comes down to for instance changing the semantics of composition 
; to  the composition of ;, where S 1 ; S 2 is defined as
possib leC ardT ear  (); S 1 ; possib leC ardT ear  (); S2; possib leC ardTear  ();
— Another possibility of modeling card tears is at the logical level, i.e. in the 
logic used to  reason about programs. For instance, if our reasoning about 
Java programs uses some Hoare logic, we could adapt all Hoare rules to  allow 
for the possibility of card tears. Effectively, this comes down to for instance 
replacing the Hoare rule for composition ; by the Hoare rule for ; .
existing try -ca tch  blocks in a program. However, using E rror would introduce a 
problem in JML.
4 Still, Java Card does not support the data types double and long, for which assign­
ments are by definition non-atomic; see [8], section 17.4
3.1 Throw ing a CardTearException
8For the remainder of this paper, we leave it open which of the mechanisms above 
is used to  model the possibility of card tears. Clearly, introducing explicit calls to 
p o ssib leC ard T ear() at all program points quickly makes programs unreadable, 
so we prefer to  leave the possibility of card tears being thrown implicit.
3.2 S p ecifica tio n  a n d  v erif ic a tio n  u sing  C ardTearException
Modeling card tears as exceptions is useful both when it comes to  verifying and 
specifying Java Card code.
An in v a r ia n t  in JML has to  hold if a method throws an exception. So an 
immediate consequence of modeling card tears as exceptions is th a t to  verify a 
method we must ensure th a t invariants hold at every program point, as discussed 
earlier in Sect. 2 (and as in the approach of [1]).
Another advantage of treating card tears as exceptions is th a t it becomes 
possible to  specify the behavior in the event of a card tear in JML, as mentioned 
as a wish in Sect. 1. This is not possible in the approach of [1]. For example, we 
could specify the behavior of the method m from Fig. 1 as follows:
//@ ensures p == \old(p)+2 && t[0] == \old(t[0])+2;
//@ signals (CardTearException) (p == \old(p) || p == \old(p)+2)
//@ &&t[0]==0; 
void m() throws CardTearException{ ... }
Here the JML keyword s ig n a ls  is used to  specify an exceptional postcondition ,
i.e. a condition th a t should hold after a certain exception occurs. Note tha t here 
we assume th a t the undoing of any unfinished transaction and the resetting of 
the transient memory occurs immediately after a card tear occurs, so th a t this 
has occurred before we exit the method.
Example 2 (specifications fo r  arrayC opy(N onAtom ic)). More example specifi­
cations th a t use the notion of C ardTearException are given in Fig. 2. Here 
specifications are given for the Java Card API methods arrayCopy and a r ra y -  
CopyNonAtomic. These two methods are interesting examples because the only 
difference between them is what happens when a card tear occurs during their 
execution. The former method is atomic, so either all array entries are copied, or 
none are. The latter method is not atomic, so some array entries may be copied 
whereas others are not. The JML specifications in Fig. 2, more in particular 
the s ig n a ls  clauses, make this difference precise. Note th a t the specification 
of arrayCopyNonAtomic makes no assumptions on the order in which the array 
elements are copied.
4 M odeling  th e  clearing o f transient m em ory
We now consider how to model the clearing of transient memory in the event of 
a card tear. Because transient data is completely unaffected by transactions, we 
can consider this issue in isolation, without taking into account how we model 
the transaction mechanism.
9/*@ requires src != null && dest != null &&
@ srcOff >= 0 && destOff >= 0 && length >= 0 &&
@ srcOff+length <= src.length && destOff+length <= dest.length;
@
@ assignable dest[destOff..destOff+length— 1];
@
@ ensures (\forall short i; 0 <= i && i < length
@ ; dest [destOff+i] == \old(src[srcOff+i]));
@ signals (CardTearException)
@ (\forall short i; 0 <= i && i < length
@ ; dest [destOff+i] == \old(src[srcOff+i]))
@ || (\ forall short i; 0 <= i && i < length
@ ; dest [destOff+i] == \old(dest[destOff+i]));
@*/
native public static final short arrayCopy(byte[] src,
short srcOff, 
byte [] dest , 
short destOff, 
short length);
/*@ requires ...
@ assignable ...
@ ensures ...
@
@ signals (CardTearException)
@ (\forall short i; 0 <= i && i < length
@ ; dest [destOff+i] == \old(src[srcOff+i])
@ || dest [destOff+i] == \old(dest[destOff+i]) );
@*/
native public static final short arrayCopyNonAtomic(byte[] src,
short srcOff, 
byte [] dest , 
short destOff, 
short length);
F ig . 2. JML specifications for the API methods arrayCopy and 
arrayCopyNonAtomic. In the latter only the differences with the former 
are shown.
We model the clearing of transient memory by enclosing every method in a 
try -c a tc h , where in the ca tch  the transient memory is cleared, i.e. reset to  the 
initial default for th a t type. For the code from Fig. 1, this desugaring results in:
class A {
/ /  persistent field p, allocated in EEPROM 
byte p;
//@ invariant p % 2 == 0 && 0<= p && p < 10;
/ /  transient array t , so t [0] is allocated in RAM 
byte[] t = makeTransientByteArray(1,CLEAR_ON_RESET);
//@ invariant t != null && t.length == 1;
//@ invariant t[0] % 2 == 0;
//@ ensures p == \old(p) + 2 && t[0] == \old(t[0])+2; 
void m() { 
try {
beginTransaction(); 
p+—+; t[0]+—+; p+—+; 
if (p < 10) commitTransaction();
else abortTransaction(); 
t[0]+—+;
}
catch (CardTearException e) {
for (int i = 0; i < t.length; i+—+) t[i] = 0; / /  clear transient array t
10
throw e; //  re—throw the exception
}
}
}
Note th a t in this particular example the explicit clearing of the transient array 
t  in the event of a CardTearException will re-establish the invariant t [0 ]  % 2 
== 0.
One subtlety in the desugaring above is th a t during the clearing of transient 
memory in the ca tch  block we do not want to  allow card tears.
The only question in this desugaring is deciding which transient arrays a 
method should clear. The easiest way to  decide this is to  look at the postcondi­
tions (i.e. the en su res and s ig n a ls  clauses in conjunction with any in v a ria n ts )  
tha t we want to  prove for the method. Letting every method clear only the 
transient fields mentioned in its postconditions is sufficient. If a method calls 
another method, and a card tear occurs in this inner method call, this may lead 
to  transient arrays being cleared several times, but as this clearing is clearly an 
idempotent operation, this is not a problem.
The only problem th a t can arise is when a specification refers to  a transient 
field of another object to  which the current object does not have access. In JML 
specifications the normal visibility constraints imposed by the Java modifiers 
(such as p r iv a te  or p ro te c te d )  can be loosened up, so it is possible for a JML 
specification of a method to  mention a transient field o . t [ 0 ]  of some other 
object o even though this field is not accessible from within th a t method. To 
cope with this, the object o in question would have to  be extended to  provide a 
method c le a rT ra n s ie n ts ( )  th a t clears its transient fields.
We should stress again th a t in Java Card applets transient data typically 
serves as scratch-pad memory, so tha t it is unlikely th a t we are interested in any 
invariants or postconditions involving transient data.
Note th a t both specifications in Fig. 2 exclude the effect of clearing transient 
memory: the s ig n a ls  clauses of arrayCopy and arrayCopyNonAtomic do not 
state th a t if d e s t  or s rc  are transient arrays their contents will have been cleared 
in the event of a card tear. We could modify the specifications to  include this, 
by introducing a further case distinction in the s ig n a ls  clause on whether the 
arrays in question are transient or not, and including
(JCSystem.isTransient(dest) != JCSystem.NOT_A_TRANSIENT.OBJECT)
==>
(\forall i; 0 <= i && i < dest.length; dest[i] == 0)
in the s ig n a ls  clause, and a similar statem ent for s rc . Here we use the Java 
Card API method is T ra n s ie n t, which can be use to  test if an array is transient.
However, conceptually it is much more convenient not to  make arrayCopy 
or arrayCopyNonAtomic responsible for clearing the arrays s rc  and d e s t  if they 
are transient, but to  leave it up to  the methods calling arrayCopy(NonAtomic).
11
5 M odeling  transactions
We now turn  to  the issue of modeling transactions in Java. This comes down 
to the question of how conditional updates to  persistent fields can be modeled 
in such a way th a t they can be undone in the event of an aborted transaction, 
caused by a card tear or by an invocation of ab o rtT ran sac tio n . We do this by 
mimicking the way this can be implemented in hardware. Such an implemen­
tation involves some extra bookkeeping for persistent fields th a t are changed 
during a transaction. Two values will have to  be recorded for these fields: the 
‘new’, updated value, as well as the ‘old’ value the field had at the start of the 
transaction. There are roughly two strategies for doing this, as discussed in [9]. 
Suppose a persistent field x is modified during a transaction. One strategy, the 
optim istic  strategy, is to  log the old value of x at the beginning of the transac­
tion, and use the logged value in the event of an aborted transaction to  restore x 
to  its original value. The other, pessim istic, strategy is to  work on a temporary 
copy of a persistent field x during the transaction, and copy this updated version 
of x back to  x when the transaction is committed. The optimistic approach en­
tails some extra work in case the transaction is aborted, the pessimistic approach 
entails some extra work in case the transaction is committed. We will use the 
optimistic approach, introducing an extra ‘backup’ field xbak for every field x, 
but we could just as easily have used the pessimistic approach.
Below we show how the code given in Fig. 1 can be desugared to  model the 
transaction in this way. As discussed in Sect. 3, we assume th a t at anytime the 
special CardTearException can be thrown.
class A {
byte p = 0;
byte pbak; //  backup value of p
//@ invariant p % 2 == 0 && 0 <= p && p <= 10;
byte[] t = makeTransientByteArray(1,CLEAR_ON_RESET);
//@ invariant t != null && t.length == 1;
//@ invariant t[0] % 2 == 0;
static boolean inTransaction = false;
//@ ensures p == \old(p)+2;
//@ signals (CardTearException) p == \old(p) || p == \old(p)+2;
void m() { 
try {
pbak = p; //  backup p
if (inTransaction) TransactionException.throwIt(IN_PROGRESS) 
inTransaction = true; //  begin transaction
pH—+; t[0]+—+; pH—+; 
if (p < 10)
inTransaction = false; / /  commit transaction 
else {
p = pbak; //  restore old value of p
inTransaction = false; / /  abort transaction
}
t[0] +—+;} catch (CardTearException e) { 
if (inTransaction) { 
p = pbak; / /  restore old value of p
for (int i = 0; i < t.length; i+—+) t[i] = 0; / /  clear transient array t 
throw e; / /  re-throw the exception
}
}
}
}____________________________________________________________________
The changes to  the code are:
— An extra field pbak is introduced for the bookkeeping of the old value of p 
during a transaction.
— A static field (i.e. a global variable) in T ran sa c tio n  is introduced to  record 
whether a transaction is in progress or not.
— The entire method is included in a try -c a tc h  construction, which, in case 
of a card tear, undoes the effects of any transaction if a transaction was in 
progress.
— Any calls to  begin-, commit-, and ab o r tT ran sac tio n  are replaced by a code 
fragments which set in T ran sac tio n , and backup or restore the value of p.
In general, at the place where the commit- or ab o r tT ra n sa c tio n  we should check 
tha t a transaction is indeed in progress, or else throw a T ransactionE xcep tion , 
by including
if (! inTransaction) TransactionException.throwIt(NOT_IN_PROGRESS);
We have om itted this in the example above because it is obvious tha t here this 
situation does not arise.
One subtlety in the desugaring above is th a t during the bookkeeping associ­
ated with restoring an aborted transaction we should not allow card tears.
Although the example above is a very simple one, we believe th a t this desug­
aring of transactions can be used for most Java Card programs.
Similar to  the modeling of the clearing of transient memory, the only difficult 
issue in this desugaring of transactions is deciding for which persistent fields 
should be restored. This issue can be solved in exactly the same way: only 
the persistent fields mentioned in the invariant and pre- and postconditions are 
relevant for the verification of an individual method, and only for these do we 
have to  restore the old values in the event of a card tear, i.e. in ca tch  block at 
the end of a method, and in the event of an ab o rtT ran sac tio n . If a method calls 
another method, and a card tear occurs in this inner method call, this may lead 
to  persistent fields being restored several times, but as this restoring is clearly 
an idempotent operation, this is not a problem.
Similar to  the modeling of the clearing of transient memory, the only prob­
lem th a t can arise is when a specification refers to  a persistent field of another 
object to  which the current object does not have access. As we have mentioned 
before in JML specifications the normal visibility constraints imposed by the 
Java modifiers can be loosened up, so it is possible for a JML specification of a 
method to  mention a persistent field o .p  of some other object o even though this 
field is not accessible from within th a t method. To cope with this, the object o in 
question would have to  be extended to  provide methods b a c k u p P e rs is te n ts ( )  
and r e s to r e P e r s i s t e n t s ( )  to  backup and restore the values of its persistent 
fields.
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6 Im plem entation
Figure 3 provides an overview of our project. We have described how the pre­
processor can simulate some Java Card issues into a Java model. So far, we have 
not tried to  mechanize the desugaring we have introduced in this paper.
F ig . 3. Inbedding of Java Card transactions into Java based proof checking sys­
tems
It is quite easy to  do the desugaring for the clearing of transient memory and 
for transactions by hand. Main question is how to deal with possib leC ardT ear. 
As discussed in Section 3, there are several ways of dealing with this. Each of 
these requires a large amount of work, namely redefining the semantics of all 
Java Card statem ent and expression constructors, reformulating an reproving 
all Hoare rule, or redefining the whole weakest precondition strategy.
In the setup for our LOO P/PVS combination we can estimate the amount 
of work the last two options imply. It is huge. Therefore we hope th a t it will 
be less work if we take the full syntactical approach. Furthermore it seems wise 
to  go for the practical approach: just verify th a t invariants are never broken 
outside transactions, as part of PVS strategies, as in [1]. Obviously, for other 
proof checking systems, the situation might be different.
7 C onclusion
We have shown how Java Card features such as card tears, transactions, and 
transient as opposed to  persistent memory can be faithfully modeled inside Java, 
making it possible to  use existing programming logics for Java to  reason about 
these features. An advantage of the approach is th a t it is to  a large extent 
independent of the Java semantics being used. An added benefit of such a model 
inside Java is th a t it is understandable to  a larger audience - th e  desugarings 
should provide anyone with a good knowledge of Java with a clear understanding 
of the semantics of card tears and transactions, and with useful basis about
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reasoning about the features- and tha t we can use standard JML to specify 
properties of these features.
A disadvantage of the approach is tha t it is somewhat ad-hoc. A definition 
of a semantics for Java Card from scratch, be it denotational or operational 
semantics, or an axiomatic semantics as Hoare logic or weakest precondition 
calculus, would provide less ad-hoc and more rigorous semantics. Furthermore, 
it is somewhat unsatisfactory th a t we have to  assume th a t during our event 
handling code there will not be another card tear.
It is im portant to  realize th a t Java Card programs are extremely simple pro­
grams, without much complicated class hierarchies or OO structure to  speak of. 
In many applications the only object, apart from some byte arrays used as fields, 
is a single object of class jav aca rd .fram ew o rk .ap p le t. For such programs it is 
trivial to  decide at compile time what the relevant persistent and transient data 
at runtime will be.
To our knowledge, the only other work on Java Card tha t does not ignore 
transactions and card tears is [1]. The approach presented there can be used to 
prove th a t certain invariants are never broken, but cannot establish postcondi­
tions in the event of a card tear, as discussed in Sect. 2.1, or distinguish between 
the atomic and non-atomic API methods for copying arrays discussed in Ex. 2.
Unfortunately, the Java model is quite unreadable if it takes all explicit card 
tears into account. The implementation of the existing T ransactionE xcep tions 
also really decreases readability, which makes this method less practical. On the 
other hand, knowing these syntactical problems it should not be too difficult to 
implement some of these solutions into the semantics of the proof system. For 
our own LOOP tool we are quite convinced th a t this can be done.
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